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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner and Appellant G&C Case Family Trust, Gordon and Claudia Case,
Trustees ("Case Family Trust"), appeals from the Judgment and Order of the lower court
entered in this matter on February 17, 2005 (Attachment 1 hereto), sustained by its Order
Denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment entered June
30, 2005 (Attachment 2 hereto). By its orders, the trial court established a boundary line
between a Utah County property owned by the Case Family Trust and that owned by
Respondents/ Appellees Ronald and Geraldine Jensen ("Jensens"), locating the line one
foot to the east of the eastern edge of an irrigation canal lying wholly within the record
boundaries of the Case Family Trust's property, under the doctrine of "boundary by
acquiescence." In so holding, the trial court ruled that, as a matter of law (and without the
benefit of evidence or trial), Jensens had established all necessary elements of boundary
by acquiescence at that location, entitling them to claim not only the irrigation ditch (and
one foot of land to the east thereof), but a portion of property to the west of the ditch, to
all of which the Case Family Trust owned record title - as well as a strip of property lying
between the two properties to which neither the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens held
title.
In fact, there was ample evidence before the trial court to establish genuine issues
of material fact precluding a summary judgment finding of boundary by acquiescence,
thereby defeating the Case Family Trust's record title to its property. The status of the
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canal itself as an irrigation easement for the benefit of both parties (as well as other
property owners located to the south); the lack of acquiescence by the Case Family Trust
(or its predecessors in interest) in the east bank of the canal as the boundary line of their
property; the placement of historic fences to the west of the irrigation ditch to mark the
boundary line; the existence of a 1941 boundary line agreement between the parties'
respective predecessors in interest establishing a line to the west of the irrigation ditch as
the boundary line between the properties; and the fact that the record descriptions of the
parties' respective parcels do not adjoin, each operate to defeat applicability of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Taken together, they clearly establish that the
court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment.
JURISDICTION BASIS FOR APPEAL
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah
County, State of Utah, establishing a common boundary line between property owned by
the Case Family Trust and property owned by the Jensens, under the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). The
appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Jensens

have occupied and used the land west of, and to a point one foot east of the east bank of,
725286vl
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the concrete irrigation ditch for residential and agricultural purposes for a period of more
than 20 years.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the east

bank of the irrigation ditch was a visible line marking the boundary between the Case
Property and the Jensen Property for a period of more than 20 years.
3.

Whether Jensens and the Case Family Trust mutually acquiesced in

Jensens' use and occupancy of all portions of the Case Property to the west of the eastern
edge of the irrigation ditch, and to the establishment of a line one foot east of the east
bank of the concrete irrigation ditch as the boundary between their respective properties,
for a period of more than 20 years.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the

Boundary Agreement between the parties' predecessors-in-interest that established the
boundary line between the G&C Property and the Jensen Property to lie to the west of the
irrigation ditch, was ineffective to bind the parties.
All of the foregoing issues were preserved in the Case Family Trust memoranda
before the trial court: R. 95-108; 169-176; 183-186.
The standard of review for all of the foregoing issues is that applicable to orders
granting summary judgment generally - the decision is reviewed for correctness,
affording no deference to the trial court's decision. Schurtz v. BMW of North America,
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of
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Springville, 1999 Utah 25, 979 P.2d 332. The court reviews the record, and construes all
facts in the light most favorable to defendant/appellant, and sustains the lower court's
ruling only if, as a matter of law, no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding
entry of summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991);
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah
1991).
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 - Water Is Declared Property of the Public
All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby
declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the
use thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-6 - Eminent Domain - Purposes
Any person shall have a right of way across and upon public, private and
corporate lands, or other rights of way, for the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water gates, canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, pipe lines and areas for setting up pumps and pumping
machinery or other means of securing, storing, replacing and conveying
water for domestic, culinary, industrial and irrigation purposes or for any
necessary public use, or for drainage, upon payment of just compensation
therefore, but such right of way shall in all cases be exercised in a manner
not unnecessarily to impair the practical use of any other right of way,
highway or public or private road, or to injure any public or private
property.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-14 - Interfering with Water Works or with Apportioning
Official - Penalty and Liability
(1)
Any person, who in any way unlawfully interferes with,
injures, destroys or removes any dam, head gate, wier, casing, valve, cap or
other appliances for the diversion, apportionment, measurement or
725286vl
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regulation of water, or who interferes with any person authorized to
apportion water while in the discharge of his duties, is guilty of a crime
punishable under § 73-2-27.
(2)
Any person who commits an act defined as a crime under this
section is also liable in a civil action for damages or other relief to any
person injured by that act.
(3)
(a)
A civil action under this section may be brought
independent of a criminal action.
(b)
Proof of the elements of a civil action under this
section need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Case Family Trust filed its Complaint in this action on September 26, 2003
(R0001-0004), seeking to quiet title in and to a parcel of property located in Benjamin,
Utah County, State of Utah ("Case Property"), free and clear from any claim of right, title
or interest asserted by Jensens. Jensens counterclaimed on October 21, 2003 (R00190026), claiming a boundary line to their property (located to the west of the Case Family
Trust property, "Jensen Property") extending approximately 109 feet to the east of an
irrigation ditch lying within the west record boundary line of the Case Property; in the
alternative, that the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch be deemed the boundary line
between the parties' respective properties under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence; and for an order of the court that Jensens have prescriptive right to use the
head gates on the western edge of the irrigation ditch.
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Jensens moved for summary judgment on June 28, 2004 (R0039-0040). In their
motions, Jensens abandoned their claim that they owned 109 feet to the east of the
irrigation ditch, but sought to establish, as a matter of law, that their property extended to
the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch (i.e., within the Case Family Trust's record
boundary line) under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence (R0041-0052). Following
discovery, the Case Family Trust filed its opposition to Jensens' Motion for Summary
Judgment on October 22, 2004 (R0094). In opposition to Jensens' Motion, the Case
Family Trust submitted an affidavit of Claudia Case; an affidavit of surveyor Donald
Clair Allen; affidavits of John Lindstrom, Ronald T. Ludlow (both of whom had given
affidavits to Jensens in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, but who modified
their testimony by supplemental affidavit), the affidavit of John McDonald (a neighboring
property owner and water user), and depositions of Neil Anderson and Patricia H.
Mitchell.
Counsel presented oral argument on November 29, 2004 (R0202). At the
conclusion of argument, the court ruled from the bench that, as a matter of law, all
elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence had been established, sufficient to
constitute the east bank of the irrigation ditch the boundary between the parties'
respective properties. The court directed the parties to submit survey information to
establish the legal description of the boundary lines location (R0157).
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Thereafter, a telephonic status conference occurred between the court and counsel
on January 12, 2005 (ROl59), pursuant to which the court directed Jensens' counsel to
furnish a boundary line establishing the boundary between the properties, not on the
eastern edge of the irrigation ditch, but one foot to the east of the ditch's edge (apparently
to permit Jensens to erect a fence thereon). In accordance therewith, Jensens' counsel
submitted, and the court signed, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ROl 61-0163,
Attachment 3 hereto), and a Judgment and Order (ROl64-0165, Attachment 1 hereto),
both entered on February 17, 2005. By its Findings, Conclusions and Order, the court
quieted title, in the Case Family Trust, in and to only those portions of its record title
property lying more than one foot to the east of the irrigation ditch, granting to Jensens
title to all portions of the Case Property lying to the west thereof.
On March 4, 2005, the Case Family Trust filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment or Order (ROl 68). By order dated
June 30, 2005, the lower court denied the Case Family Trust's Motion to Amend
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment (R0191-0192, Attachment 2 hereto).
The Case Family Trust filed its Notice of Appeal on July 19, 2005 (ROl 93-0194,
Attachment 4 hereto). By order dated July 26, 2005 (ROl96), the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
5.

Gordon and Claudia Case, as Trustees of the G&C Case Family Trust,

Petitioner and Appellant herein ("Case Family Trust"), are the owners of property located
at 3535 West 7550 South, Benjamin, Utah County, State of Utah. Affidavit of Claudia
Case (R0113-0115) at 12.
6.

The property at the above address (hereafter "Case Property") is more

particularly described as follows:
Commencing 19.286 chains North and 1.609 chains East of the South
Quarter Corner of Section 29, Township 8 South, Range 2 East of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0°8f East 15.044 chains; thence
North 18°38f East 0.274 chains; thence North 0°24f East 9.990 chains;
thence North 89°59f East 9.990 chains; thence South 0°15' West 25.267
chains; thence South 89°49* West 10.072 chains to the place of beginning.
Affidavit of Gordon and Claudia Case in Support of Motion for TRO and/or Preliminary
Injunction (R0006-0009) at H 2.
7.

The Case Family Trust purchased the Case Property from Patricia Mitchell

and Diane Nielsen on September 12, 2002, taking by warranty deed. Id. at % 1; Depo. of
Patricia Mitchell (R. 137-151) at p. 4 and Exhibit 1 thereto.
8.

The Case Family Trust's transferors, Patricia Mitchell and Diane Nielsen,

had inherited the Case Property from their father, who had owned and fanned the

1

In accordance with this Court's standard of review, the following facts are stated in a
light most favorable to the position of the Case Family Trust, as the non-moving party
before the trial court. All statements of fact are supported by admissions in the pleadings
or otherwise by statements and exhibits in the record.
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property for 40-50 years prior to his death. Depo. of Patricia H. Mitchell (R0137-0151) at
P-5.
9.

As transferor, Patricia Mitchell had no understanding or belief that she was

unable, or not intending, to transfer all of the Case Property as described in the deed. Id.
at p. 6-8.
10.

The description on the warranty deed was believed to have come from the

transferors' tax records. Id. at p. 9.
11.

The Case Property is bounded on the north by an irrigation ditch belonging

to the Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company. Affidavit of Claudia Case (ROl 13-0115)
at Uf 3 and 4.
12.

At a certain point, the irrigation ditch turns south, runs the length of the

Case Property from north to south, and onto neighboring lands to the south of the Case
Property. Id.
13.

The Case Family Trust owns water rights from the Spanish Fork South

Irrigation Company, and may divert those rights at any point along the ditch. Id.
14.

The Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company has recorded four (4) water

easements on the Case Property. The irrigation ditch, as it bounds the Case Property to
the north and crosses it on the west side, is subject to these easements. Affidavit of
Donald Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) at f 5.
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15.

Upon acquiring the Case Property, the Case Family Trust caused it to be

surveyed. Id. at % 3.
16.

The surveyor learned that the western boundary of the Case Property lies to

the west of the irrigation ditch. Id. at % 4.
17.

From 1966 until the fall of 2002, the Case Property was farmed by Ronald

T. Ludlow, brother-in-law to Patricia H. Mitchell. Depo. of Patricia H. Mitchell (R01370151) at p. 5; Affidavit of Ronald T. Ludlow (R0118-0121) atfflf3-4.
18.

Mr. Ludlow farmed and worked the Case Property to the edge of the

irrigation ditch on the west - not because he believed, or had been given to understand,
that the irrigation ditch marked the western boundary of the property, but because the
property to the west thereof was inaccessible. Affidavit of Ronald T. Ludlow
(R0118-0121) UK 13-17.
19.

Mr. Ludlow, though, never understood the boundary to the Case Property

to lie on the east bank of the ditch. Id. at f 14.
20.

The northern segment of the irrigation ditch crossing the Case Property was

lined with concrete by the Spanish Fork Irrigation Company in the spring of 1967. Id. at
f 7. The section of the irrigation ditch running from north to south along the west side of
the Case Property was lined with concrete by Raynold Jensen (father to
Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen) and Arthur Hansen (a neighbor to the south of the
Case Property), consistent with the practice of the irrigation company of permitting water
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users to maintain the ditch in areas where there are only a few remaining users holding
water rights. Id. at ffi| 10-12; Affidavit of John Lindstrom (R0116-0117) at f 7.
21.

Defendants and Appellees Ronald and Geraldine Jensen own and occupy

property to the west of the Case Property, which they received via warranty deed from
Ronald S. Jensen dated February 9, 1999, recorded as Entry 15109 of Book 4968, p. 256
of the Real Property Records of Utah County, State of Utah. Complaint (ROO 13-0015) at
K 8; Answer (R0019-0026) at f 8.
22.

The Jensen Property is more fully described as follows:

Commencing 1 Chain East of the center of Section 29, Township 8 South,
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 4.66 chains
thence West 20.40 chains; thence South 4.66 chains; thence East 7.28
chains; thence South 5.84 chains; thence East 14.22 chains; thence North
5.44 chains to the place of beginning.
Complaint (R0006-0009) at K 9; Answer (ROO 19-0026) at f 9.2
23.

The Case Property and the Jensen Property are not contiguous, nor do their

record boundaries adjoin one another; rather, there is a gap between them. Affidavit of
Don Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) at HI 6 and 9.
24.

A parcel of property located just south of the Jensen Property, and bordered

on the east by the Case Property, is currently owned by an individual named Roberts.
Affidavit of Don Clair Allen-Surveyor (R0109-0112) atfl 7.

2

In their Answer, Jensens claimed to have received "additional property which is not
described in Petitioner's Complaint"; however, this claim was never substantiated by
affidavit or other evidence of record in this case.
725286vl
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25.

The Roberts Property is fenced where it adjoins the Jensen Property and the

Case Property; the fence on the Roberts-Case border is located west of the irrigation ditch
by several feet. Id.
26.

If a person stands at the northeast corner of the Roberts Property and looks

northward along the western most surveyed boundary line of the Case Property, he/she
will see trees along the Jensen parcel directly in line with the surveyed boundary,
suggesting the existence of a fence line at one time. Affidavit of Claudia Case
(R0113-0115) at 1f 10.
27.

Prior to its current ownership, the Roberts Property was owned by John

McDonald. Affidavit of John McDonald (R0122-0123) at % 2.
28.

During the time that he owned the Roberts Property, John McDonald

observed a small fence occasionally put up by Jensens to contain cattle; the fence was
placed on the west side of the irrigation ditch. Id. at f 4.
29.

In 1941, a boundary agreement was recorded with the Utah County

Recorder's Office in Book 361, p. 255, purporting to establish a boundary between the
Case Property and the Jensen Property. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen-Surveyor
(R0109-0112)at1[8.
30.

The purpose of the boundary agreement was to declare a fence line to be the

boundary between the parcels. Id.
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31.

The described location of the fence line places the entire Jensen Property

west of both the existing irrigation ditch and the western record boundary of the Case
Property. Id.
32.

By virtue of the trial court's ruling, the Case Family Trust has lost more

than a strip of land - under governing law, Utah County's willingness to permit future
subdivision of the Case Property has been compromised due to lack of sufficient acreage.
Affidavit of Claudia Case (R. 0113-0115) atf 11. "
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's Order Granting Summary Judgment rested on a finding that, as a
matter of law, Jensens had established a line, located one foot to the east of the east bank
of a north-south irrigation ditch on the Case property, as the boundary between the Case
and Jensen properties. In so holding, the trial court found that Jensens had established
each element required under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence:
(1)

occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings;

(2)

mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary;

(3)

for a long period of time;

(4)

by adjoining land owners.

In fact, Jensens established none of these elements.
Jensens did not demonstrate "occupation" of the disputed area, other than to claim
that they shared (with a downstream neighbor) in the cost of lining the irrigation ditch in
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1967, and that they ran irrigation water from the ditch to their property thereafter.
Maintenance of the irrigation ditch, however, was part and parcel of the obligation of
Jensens (together with other irrigation company shareholders) to maintain the ditch, and
was not done by them alone. Access to the ditch, and use of irrigation water, is a right
granted by state law, and cannot be seen as "occupancy" of the underlying property within
the meaning of the doctrine. The line established by the court, moreover, was not marked
by any "monuments, fences or buildings." It was not marked by anything. It was a
randomly-chosen line lying to the east of an existing irrigation ditch - which, in and of
itself, has been rejected by Utah case law as a proper "visible line" for purposes of
boundary by acquiescence.
Jensens failed to show mutual acquiescence in the established line as a boundary.
A party claiming boundary by acquiescence must show not only use and occupancy up to
a physical line, but mutual acquiescence in that line as a boundary. In fact, there was a
complete failure of proof in this regard; moreover, the Case Family Trust offered
significant proof that the parties did not regard any line east of the irrigation ditch as the
common boundary line between the properties. Certainly, no evidence placed any
mutually-acquiesced-in line one foot east of the irrigation ditch. Jensens may not rely (as
the trial court apparently found) on the Case Family Trust's non-user of property to the
west of the irrigation ditch in this regard - by undisputed testimony, property to the west
of the irrigation ditch was inaccessible to the Case Family Trust and its predecessors in
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interest, and its non-user cannot constitute acquiescence. Finally, the parties'
predecessors in interest expressly located the boundary between the properties by an
agreement recorded in 1941. Where a boundary line is expressly found by agreement, no
post-agreement conduct may arise to the level of acquiescence in a different boundary
line.
Since no physical boundary was established, no occupation up to that line was
shown, and no acquiescence in the line as a boundary was demonstrated, no conduct on
behalf of either the Case Family Trust or the Jensens persisted for the requisite period of
time (20 years), in order to establish boundary by acquiescence.
Finally, the Case Family Trust and Jensens are not "adjoining property owners"there is a gap between their properties owned by an undisclosed third party, as established
by the only survey work of record in the case. In addition, they are separated by the
easement underlying the irrigation ditch itself, in favor of the Spanish Fork South
Irrigation Company. Absent contiguity, the requirement that the boundary be established
between "adjoining landowners" fails, and Jensens' claim in fact implicates property
rights of un-joined third parties,
ARGUMENT
It is important, in passing on the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this
matter, to begin with those facts which were in fact not disputed by either party.
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All parties acknowledge that the Case Family Trust received conveyance of the
Case Property by an otherwise-valid, enforceable warranty deed, recorded as Entry
No. 107659:2002, in the records of the Utah County Recorder (R.0137). The deed was
effective to pass record title to all portions of the land described - Utah Code Ann. § 571-12.
The nature and extent of Jensens' title to the property lying to the west of the Case
Property is likewise not in dispute. In pleadings, Jensens admitted to the accuracy to the
legal description contained in the Case Family Trust's Complaint (ROOOl-0004). (In their
Answer, Jensens represented that they had received conveyance of additional property;
however, the additional conveyance was never produced, no description of the additional
property was ever offered, and no evidence of additional land ownership was ever
presented to the court.)
Finally, there is no dispute in the record concerning the conclusions reached by the
sole surveyor offering evidence in this matter. Donald Clair Allen, a certified Utah land
surveyor, presented his affidavit on October 22, 2004, establishing (without challenge)
the following:
•

That the western boundary of the Case Property lies west of the irrigation
ditch located in the northwest portion of the Case Property;
That the Spanish Fork Irrigation Company has recorded four (4) water
easements in connection with the irrigation ditch on the Case Property;
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•

That the Jensen Property does not extend to the western edge of the eastern
(or western) edge of the irrigation ditch running north to south along the
western portion of the Case Property;

•

That a 1941 Boundary Agreement was recorded with Utah County in
Book 361, p. 255, establishing a boundary line between the Case Property
and the Jensen Property, located to the west of the irrigation ditch; and

•

That the Jensen parcel does not even line up contiguous with the western
edge of the Case Property - that a gap exists between the two, ownership to
which lies in neither the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens.

Jensens' motion attempted to sidestep all of the foregoing, though, by reliance on
the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. After briefing and oral argument, the
trial court concluded that the Jensens had established, as a matter of law, that the parties
had acquiesced for the necessary period of time in a boundary line lying one foot to the
east of the eastern most edge of the irrigation ditch running from north to south along the
western portion of the Case Property. In order to be sustainable on appeal, the court's
ruling must be legally correct, giving all due deference to the facts of the case construed
most favorably to the Case Family Trust (see cases at pp. 3-4, above).
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, first recognized in Utah in 1906
(Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P.2d 1009 (1906)) was crafted as a means of resolving
boundary disputes where surveys of record did not mirror longstanding practices and
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understandings. Its purpose is to establish "stability in boundaries, repose of titles, and
prevention of litigation" -Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979).3 The
Doctrine was never intended as a vehicle for seizing title to land not validly owned, by
laying unilateral claim up to a line not mutually understood as a common boundary.
For this reason, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has been narrowly and
strictly drawn. As stated in Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1993):
Utah courts have always restrictively applied this doctrine.
[Citation omitted.] A party claiming title by acquiescence
must establish all of the required elements to give rise to a
presumption of ownership in his or her favor.
848 P.2d at 168-169. Failure to meet any of the elements of the doctrine defeats the
boundary as a matter of law. Hales v. Frakes, cited supra, at 559.
The elements which must be established by a claimant seeking to defeat a
neighbor's record title by invoking boundary by acquiescence have been stated many
times. Most recently, this court again articulated the standard as follows:
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i) occupation
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary,
(iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining land owners.
Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App.346, 118 P.3d 301 at If 3 (quoting Jacobs v. Haven, 917
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)).

3

Given the number of recently-reported cases from Utah's appellate courts dealing
with boundary by acquiescence, the last purpose enumerated in the Hales decision seems
not to have been realized.
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In granting Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, then, the trial
court concluded not only that Jensens presented evidence probative of each of the
foregoing elements, but established all four beyond the existence of any genuine issue of
material fact. In fact, the record discloses evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact,
would defeat each and every one of the four elements.
POINT I.

A.

JENSENS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE "OCCUPATION" UP TO A
VISIBLE LINE MARKED BY MONUMENTS, FENCES OR
BUILDINGS, LYING ONE FOOT TO THE WEST OF THE
IRRIGATION DITCH'S WEST BANK.
Jensens Presented No Evidence of "Occupancy" Past the Eastern
Record Boundary of the Jensen Property.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensens presented affidavits
from John Lindstrom, Ronald Ludlow and Ronald Jensen. The Court is invited to review
these affidavits in depth - nowhere do they allege any acts constituting "occupancy" of
any property east of Jensens' record, deeded boundary line. They do not claim that the
disputed land was farmed, that it was fenced, that it was improved, or that it was lived on.
Instead, Jensens claim only (1) participation in lining the irrigation ditch with concrete in
1967, and (2) the running of irrigation water from the irrigation ditch to the Jensen
Property - see Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R0041 -0052) at pp. 2-3.
The Case Family Trust, by contrast, presented the trial court with competent (and,
indeed, undisputed) evidence conclusively defeating any claim that such minimal acts
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constituted "occupancy" to the east edge of the irrigation ditch (or beyond). Mr. Ludlow
(a prior occupant of the Case Property, who gave affidavits to both sides) testified that the
north-south leg of the irrigation ditch (upon which Jensens rely as the boundary) was
maintained by its downstream water recipients, rather than by the Spanish Fork South
Irrigation Company (which owned the system and issued the water shares), according to
standard water company practice. Ludlow Affidavit (R.Ol 16-0121) at Tffi 10 and 16. John
Lindstrom, who has owned and occupied property to the south of the properties in
dispute, confirmed this member-maintenance obligation (Lindstrom Affidavit, R01160117) at f 7. Mr. Ludlow further testified that the portion of the irrigation ditch now
relied upon by Jensens as their eastern boundary was lined with concrete, not only by
Raynold Jensen (Ronald Jensen's father), but by Arthur Hansen, owner of the property to
the south - Id. atffif11 and 12.
In short, Jensens have no more "occupied" land to the eastern edge of the irrigation
ditch than did their neighbor to the south, or any other water user drawing from the
irrigation ditch, incident to the commonly-understood maintenance obligations which
such users share. The ditch itself is subject to an easement in favor of the Spanish Fork
South Irrigation Company - see R0095-0098. The actions of Jensens and their neighbors
in lining the ditch was in furtherance of the easement's primary purpose: the delivery of
irrigation water to users downstream. It does not and cannot constitute "occupancy" of
the underlying fee.
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The fact that Jensens have taken water from the ditch, to irrigate the Jensen
Property, offers no further aid. Under Utah law, water users are entitled to access the
ditch in order to utilize their water shares; indeed, any action which the Case Family Trust
(or its predecessors in interest) could have taken to prevent such access would have
constituted a criminal act and exposed them to civil liability - Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-14.
The irrigation ditch is an artificial channel maintained for the benefit of a licensed water
company, dispersing public waters to shareholders (Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1). Jensens'
accessing of water rights, as irrigation company members, puts no one on notice of an
"occupancy" claim for purposes of boundary by acquiescence.
In the case of Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d
145 (1973) (cited with approval in Englert v. Zane, cited supra), the court stated the
following:
Utah courts consider [the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence] as a foundational one relating to rights based
on actual possession of land.
511 P.2d at 147 (emphasis added). Even if undisputed, Jensens' evidence of "actual
possession" was inadequate as a matter of law to satisfy the "occupancy" requirement of
the doctrine; the trial court's finding that occupancy was established as a matter of law,
even in the face of the Case Family Trust's opposing evidence, was clearly incorrect.
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B.

The Line One Foot East of the East Bank of the Irrigation Ditch was
not Established, as a Matter of Law, as a "Visible Line Marked by
Monuments, Fences, or Buildings."

Consistent with this underlying purpose, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
usually entails the effect of a fence, tree line or other physical marker commonly used by
adjoining landowners as a boundary line. Unlike a fence, an irrigation ditch is not
typically used to mark boundaries. In fact, the only reported Utah case in which an
irrigation ditch was invoked as establishing boundary by acquiescence was Fuoco v.
Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). Therein, the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs contention that an irrigation ditch could constitute a physical
boundary - not only because the ditch was small and unobtrusive (admittedly not the case
here), but because "a boundary line, to be established by acquiescence, must be definite,
certain and not speculative." 421 P.2d 946 (citing Thompson On Real Property, § 3036,
p. 526) . The Court in Fuoco clearly implied that, by its nature, an irrigation ditch is not
a common enough device to demark boundaries that its invocation satisfies the requirements of the doctrine:
any number of ditches could crisscross one's property for the purpose of
irrigating land without any contention or realistic assumption that they were
to be boundary lines"
41 P.2d at 947.
The trial court's assumption, based on nothing but the evidence before it, that the
irrigation ditch here was intended as a "monument" to mark a boundary was clearly
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speculative, and precluded by Fuoco. Certainly, the trial court engaged in total
speculation by establishing the east bank of the ditch, on the side opposite Jensens'
supposed "occupancy" as the "monument" when Jensen had in no way "occupied" to that
bank.4
Yet, the trial court went even further. Its order extended the boundary to a line one
foot east of the eastern most edge of the irrigation ditch - not because there was any
"monument" at that location, but for the convenience of the Jensens. If on no other basis,
the trial court's ruling fails on this point alone.

Jensens did not "occupy", in any sense cognizable under boundary by
acquiescence, up to any definite and non-speculative "monument". On this basis alone,
the trial court's ruling depriving the Case Family Trust of its property was error.
POINT IL

JENSENS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, THE PARTIES MUTUALLY ACQUIESCED IN A POINT
ONE FOOT EAST OF THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE
IRRIGATION DITCH AS A BOUNDARY.

Meager though the evidence was to establish "occupancy" up to a "physical
monument" (See Point I, above), the evidence of "mutual acquiescence" in that line as a
boundary was far slimmer. It consisted, essentially, of nothing but one unexplained

4

In Englert v. Zane, cited supra, the court recognized a river as a "monument" for
purposes of boundary by acquiescence; however, the boundary claimants were granted
their side of the river - not the opposite side - as the boundary.
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paragraph of Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen's Affidavit, stating only that "myself,
my family, and the Petitioner's [sic] predecessors in interest have all treated the east bank
of the concrete irrigation ditch as the existing boundary between our respective parcels of
property for over forty years''- Affidavit of Ronald Jensen (R0053-0055) at T[10. By
contrast, Ronald Ludlow, a prior occupant of the Case Property (who had previously
given an affidavit seeming to corroborate Mr. Jensen's testimony), clarified with a
subsequent affidavit that he did not understand, nor had he ever been informed, that the
eastern bank of the irrigation ditch marked the western boundary of the Case Property;
further, that he had never worked land further to the west than the east irrigation ditch
only because land lying to the west thereof was inaccessible. Affidavit of Ronald T.
Ludlow (R0118-0121) at ^13-17.
Other evidence was placed before the trial court casting doubt on the concept of
mutual acquiescence:
•

A view along the western record boundary line of the Case Property shows
a line of trees on the Jensen parcel directly in line with the survey boundary,
indicating the past fence line. Affidavit of Claudia Case (R0113-0115) at

lio;
•

Defendant/Appellee Ronald Jensen, at one point, erected a fence on the
west side of the irrigation ditch. Affidavit of John McDonald, (R01220123) at K
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The Roberts Property (to the south of the Jensen Property and west of the
Case Property) is fenced off from the Case Property on the west of the
irrigation ditch by several feet. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen, Surveyor
(R0109-0112)atf7;
Most telling, the Parties' predecessors-in-interest to the Case and Jensen
properties recorded a 1941 agreement, establishing a boundary between the
properties to the west of the irrigation ditch. Id. at ^[8.
With the foregoing facts in mind, the trial court's finding of mutual acquiescence
in a boundary line not of record fails on three counts.
A.

The Trial Court Was Faced with Circumstantial Evidence Tending to
Defeat the Assumption of Mutual Acquiescence.

In the case of Argyle v. Jones cited supra, this Court reiterated and reinforced the
requirement that mutual acquiescence in a boundary line as a boundary must be
established before record boundary lines could be defeated. Quoting with approval from
the case of Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949), the Court stated that
"the mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it
for a long period of time will not establish it as the true boundary." (2005 UT App. at
Tf 13). This Court then stated the following:
Thus, to establish acquiescence, [the Plaintiff] was required to show more
than inaction on the part of the [Defendants]. However, at trial, [Plaintiff]
presented no evidence of affirmative actions taken by the [Defendants] after
1961 that would suggest that they acquiesced in the fence as the boundary
line.
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(2005 UT App. 346 at f 14). The Court then observed that, in fact, the record before the
trial court suggested certain conduct on behalf of the Defendants which would defeat the
assumption that they acquiesced any non-record boundary line, including "minimal"
contact with the disputed property; a separate purchase agreement involving the disputed
property; and payment of taxes on the entire parcel. (2005 UT App. 346 at f 15).
The Argyle decision echoes requirements of various prior Utah cases establishing
that "mutual acquiescence" is a two-part inquiry: the party standing to lose ground
through boundary by acquiescence must acquiesce both in the use of the disputed
property, and in the physical monument as the common boundary line. In Wilkinson
Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, (1999 UT App. 366, 993 P.2d 229), this Court stated the
following:
Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that
both parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties acknowledge
the line as the demarcation between the properties, [citing Fuoco v.
Williams, cited supra]. Acquiescence does not require an explicit
agreement,. . . but recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both
parties must have knowledge of the existence of the line as [the] boundary
line.
(1999 UT App. 366 at 1J8, quoting Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1974)
(emphasis in original)). See also Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App. 145, 24 P.3d 1997
("A boundary by acquiescence . . . requires more than mere acquiescence in use; it
requires acquiescence to a line as a boundary" - 2001 UT App. 145 at TJ19); Ault v.
Holden, 2002 UT 33,44 P.2d 781:
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Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to
establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish
that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the
properties . . . . To do so, the party must show that both parties recognized
and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, as the
boundary line of the adjacent parcels.
2002 UT 33 at f 18 (emphasis in original).
At best, Jensens have made a prima facie case before the trial court that the Case
Family Trust acquiesced in their use of land east of their record boundary line (actual
"occupancy" not having been shown - see Point I, above). They have made no showing,
however, of any act by or on behalf of the Case Family Trust, or its predecessors,
acknowledging any point east of the Jensen Property's record line as the boundary. As in
Argyle, in fact, circumstantial evidence presented to the Court established precisely the
contrary: remnants of prior fence lines, fence lines to property immediately to the south
of the Jensen Property, etc., all point to non-acquiescence in irrigation ditch as a
boundary line.5 The Court's finding of mutual acquiescence in the face of such evidence
is simply untenable.

5

The record contains no direct evidence concerning the payment of taxes on the Case
Property. However, Patricia Mitchell's testimony that the deed description was taken
from tax records clearly implies that the Case Family Trust and its predecessor in interest
paid taxes on the described parcel. Certainly, Jensens presented no evidence to the
contrary. The Argyle decision plainly views tax payment as an indicator of nonacquiescence.
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B.

Jensens May Not Rely on Non-user by the Case Family Trust and its
Predecessors to Establish Acquiescence.

While not clearly so stated, the trial court may have relied on the fact that neither
the Case Family Trust nor its predecessors-in-interest actively farmed land west of the
irrigation ditch. By itself, however, this cannot rise to a finding of acquiescence in the
ditch as a boundary line, due to the inaccessibility of property on the far side of the ditch.
In the case of Carter v. Hanwrath, 925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's finding of mutual acquiescence through non-user, by the record
title holder, of the disputed property, given the inaccessibility of the disputed area from
the remainder of the property:
During their years of ownership, [the record titleholders] had no access to
the disputed area. It was entirely landlocked. The trial court found that
they could not access it from the remainder of their property, which was on
the plateau above the disputed area. They did not own any adjoining tract
from which access could be gained. Because of this inability to take
physical possession of the disputed area, the indolence of the [owners]
cannot be construed to be acquiescence. Their non-use must be attributed
to their physical inability to possess the disputed area, not to their
acquiescence in the edge of the plateau with its cliffs and ledges as the
boundary. We should not confuse non-use because of lack of access with
acquiescence.
925 P.2d at 962.
By the same token, Jensens may not rely upon the failure of the Case Family Trust
(or its predecessors) to farm or work property west of the irrigation ditch as evidence of
acquiescence - the ditch formed a barrier to any cultivation of property to the west
thereof. See Affidavit of Claudia Case (R00112-0115) atffif8-9; Affidavit of Ronald T.
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Ludlow (R0118-0121) atffi[13, 15 and 17. Where property cannot be accessed, its nonuse carries no implication of acquiescence in ownership by another.
C.

Even if Otherwise Established, Mutual Acquiescence is Vitiated By The
Existence of a Prior, Express Agreement Concerning the Location of
the Boundary Line.

The final problem with Jensens' claim of "mutual acquiescence" in the east edge
of the irrigation ditch as the proper boundary arose before any acts which could constitute
such "acquiescence" ever occurred. In 1941, the parties5 predecessors-in-interest
recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office a boundary line agreement which
expressly established the boundary between the Case and Jensen properties, at a location
to the west of the irrigation ditch by several feet. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen,
Surveyor (R0109-0112) at % 8 and Attachment 1 thereto.
Utah law has done away with the requirement (once incumbent upon a claimant of
boundary by acquiescence) that the true boundary lines have been the matter of objective
uncertainty and dispute. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). However,
where the parties know and acknowledge that a physical monument is not the true
boundary line, their acquiescence in its use as such boundary does not constitute it as
such. In the case of Ault v. Holden, cited supra, the Court observed the following:
When the parties agree that the line which they occupy is not the true line
and agree subsequently to ascertain the true boundary, the quality of
acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued
occupation.
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2002 Utah 33, at 1fl8 (quoting 12 Andrews 2d, Boundaries, § 83 (1997)). Similarly, in
Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, cited supra, this Court clarified the holding in
Staker, as follows:
[Plaintiff] seems to argue that Staker not only eliminates objective
uncertainty as an element, but renders knowledge of the true boundary
irrelevant. This overstates Staker and fails to acknowledge the underlying
nature of boundary by acquiescence. The 'very foundation of the doctrine
is that the law implies that the adjoining land owners were once uncertain
. . . and that the boundary was marked on the ground in settlement thereof.
After the parties have for a long period of time acquiesced in that marked
boundary, the law protects it.' Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 366
(Utah 1984) (Howe, J. dissenting).
In contrast, "if there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary
line the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, establish
a boundary line by acquiescence at another place." Nunley v. Walker, 13
Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962).
Accordingly, knowledge of the true boundary is relevant to a determination
of whether a party acquiesced in a particular line as the boundary.
1999 UT App. 366 atffif12, 13 (emphasis in original).
In this case, the trial court seems to have indulged in the same mis-impression as
did the Plaintiff in Wilkinson - that a prior agreement concerning the true location of the
boundary line (of which all parties to this action had record notice) is irrelevant in
determining the existence of acquiescence thereafter. As the Wilkinson decision makes
clear, boundary by acquiescence rests on the implicit absence of agreement concerning
the true location of a boundary line; if that boundary line is established by prior
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agreement, the implication vanishes, and no acquiescence may be found through words or
conduct.
The existence of the 1941 Boundary Agreement, on its face, vitiates the notion that
conduct after 1941 could somehow relocate that boundary to the other side of the
irrigation ditch; certainly, it raised a sufficient question of material fact to defeat summary
judgment.
*****

In the case of RHN Corporation v. Veibell, 2004 Utah 60, 96 P.3d 935, the Utah
Supreme Court observed that "acquiescence is a 'highly fact-dependent question'". (2004
UT 60 at U 24, quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). In ruling that,
as a matter of law, the parties to this action mutually acquiesced in an imaginary line one
foot east of the eastern edge of the irrigation ditch as their common boundary, the trial
court completely ignored the fact-sensitive nature of the determination which it was
making; for those reasons set out above, its holding simply cannot be sustained.
POINT III. JENSENS DEMONSTRATED NEITHER OCCUPANCY, NOR
MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE, FOR THE REQUISITE TWENTYYEAR PERIOD.
Jensens' apparent argument in satisfaction of the requirement that occupancy and
acquiescence in the boundary line persist for a "long period of time" (defined in
governing case law as more than twenty years) is satisfied by the fact that they put
concrete in the ditch more than twenty years ago, and have been taking water therefrom
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for more than twenty years. (See Factual Claims generally discussed under Point I,
above). They further apparently argue that the Case Family Trust and its predecessor-ininterest acquiesced in the ditch as the boundary line for more than twenty years by
permitting them to act as they did.
For those reasons already discussed, no conduct constituting either "occupancy"
nor "mutual acquiescence" has been continuous for a period of twenty years. To the
contrary, activities of the parties on their respective properties, like those of their
predecessors-in-interest, have all occurred within the context of a boundary line
agreement dating from 1941, expressly locating the boundary between the properties to
the west of the irrigation ditch. The time requirement, therefore, fails as well.

POINT IV. THE CASE PROPERTY AND THE JENSEN PROPERTY ARE, IN
ANY EVENT, NOT "ADJOINING"
Unrebutted evidence was presented to the trial court, by the only certified land
surveyor offering testimony, that the record east boundary line of the Jensen Property
does not adjoin the record west boundary line of the Case Property - that there is a "gap"
between the two. Affidavit of Donald Clair Allen - Surveyor (R0109-0112) at \ 9.
The trial court nowhere addressed, in its decision, the failure of this element. In
argument, Jensens' counsel did nothing but call the failing "a spurious issue of fact"
(R0202 at p. 7). The fact that the parcels do not adjoin, however, is fatal to the boundary
by acquiescence claim.
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The reason for the requirement of adjoining properties is self-evident. If neither
the Case Family Trust nor the Jensens have record title to some portion of the disputed
property, then the record title interests of some third party are implicated by Jensens'
claim of boundary by acquiescence. That third party (nowhere named or joined in this
proceeding) has no notice that his/her/its property rights are in jeopardy, and no
opportunity to appear and defend.
Utah case law has expressly held that, absent contiguity between the affected
parcels, no boundary by acquiescence may arise. In Condas v. Willesen, 61A P.2d 115
(Utah 1983), the Court rejected a claim of boundary by acquiescence based on the
existence of an unused, dedicated, strip of land between the affected parcels, owned by
Salt Lake County:
The undisputed facts show that St. Johns Street separated the property
owned by appellants from that owned by respondents through the period
during which the appellants claim to have established a boundary by
acquiescence. During that period of time, Salt Lake County was the fee
simple owner of the dedicated property. Utah Ann. 1953, § 57-5-4. It is
therefore obvious that one of the essential requirements of the doctrine of
boundary of acquiescence - that the parties be "adjoining"
landowners - has not been met in this case.
674 P.2d at 115. See also Smith v. DeNiro, 25 Utah 2d 295, 480 P.2d 480 (1971)
("without contiguity there could be no boundary by acquiescence."- 480 P.2d at 481).
The Court should further note (again consistent with the holding in Condas) that
the very "monument" invoked by Jensens as the boundary is itself located within an
easement belonging neither to Jensens nor the Case Family Trust, but to the Spanish Fork
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South Irrigation Company - which has not been joined in these proceedings. No less than
the roadway owned by Salt Lake County in Condas, the easement breaks the "adjoining
property owners" requirement, and defeats boundary by acquiescence.
By invoking the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, Jensens are attempting to
stretch their property claim not only across property owned of record by the Case Family
Trust, but across property owned by the Irrigation Company and some unnamed third
party, neither of them before the Court. Every case since 1906, articulating the elements
of boundary by acquiescence, has insisted upon the claim existing only between
"adjoining landowners." The parties to this action are not "adjoining landowners," a fact
placed before the trial court by the Case Family Trust, and undisputed by any evidence
offered by Jensens. On this basis alone, the claim must fail.
CONCLUSION
No policy underlying the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is served by its
application in this case. This is not a situation where owners of contiguous, adjoining
parcels of land, uncertain over the actual boundary of their properties, have by mutual
acquiescence established a boundary line to which they both consent. It is, rather, an
attempted land-grab by Jensens, over an easement owned by a third party and a strip of
land owned by yet another, unnamed and unknown party, based on nothing more than the
lining of an irrigation ditch, extraction of irrigation water therefrom, and the fact that the
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Case Family Trust and its predecessors-in-interest could not plow on the far side of an
irrigation ditch located within their record boundaries.
Even on its face, the Jensens' evidence before the trial court was insufficient to
make out any, much less all, of the four elements required for a finding of boundary by
acquiescence. When viewed in conjunction with countervailing evidence presented on
behalf of the Case Family Trust, the court's ruling granting summary judgment was
clearly improper - this matter should have been tried, and should now be remanded for
that purpose.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2006.
JONES WALDO H O ^ R O O K & MCDONOUGH PC

By:
incent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Docketing Statement was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following
this 5th day of January, 2006:
Harold D. Mitchell
Attorney at Law
324 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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EXHIBIT 1

Harold D. Mitchell (#2276)
Attorney for Defendants
324 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801)798-3574
Facsimile: (801)798-3576

IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORDON
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Petitioners,
Case No. 030404224

-vRONALD JENSEN and GERALDINE
JENSEN,

Judge Gary Stott

Respondents.

The court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in the matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Respondents are entitled as a matter of law to a judgment and decree
determining that the east bank of the irrigation ditch is the boundary between the land of
respondents and the land of petitioners.
2. The east bank of the irrigation ditch is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the south line of the parcel owned by Ronald S.
Jensen and Geraldine B. Jensen as described as Parcel 4 in the deed dated
February 8, 1999, and recorded February 8, 1999, as Entry No. 15109,
Book 4968, Page 256, records of Utah County Recorder, which point is
North 89°35'13" East 2774.44 feet along the quarter section line and
South 385.48 feet from the West Vi corner of Section 29, Township 8
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence East 10.23 feet
along the south boundary of said parcel to a point on the east bank of an

irrigation ditch; North 0°50'13" East 678.40 feet along the east bank of the
irrigation ditch to the north line of the parcel owned by Gordon Case and
Claudia Case, Trustees of the G&C Family Trust, as described in the deed
dated September 12, 2002, and recorded September 13, 2002, as Entry
107659:2002, records of Utah County Recorder.
Basis of bearing is Utah Coordinate System 1927 Central Zone (North
89°35' 13" East between the West % corner and the East lA corner of
Section 29, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, SLB&M).
3. The line described in paragraph 2 is the boundary between the land of
petitioners and the land of respondents. Petitioners are the owners on the east side of that
line. Respondents are the owners of the land on the west side of that line.
4. Respondents shall record a certified copy of this order in the office of the Utah
County Recorder.

Dated: -T^ll-D^

y2fwT

^ ^ ^ ' ^

Gftr3r©r£tot%Di^
Approved as to form:

Mark N. Brian
Attorney for Petitioners
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EXHIBIT 2

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

Harold D. Mitchell (#2276)
Attorney for Respondents
324 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801)798-3574
Facsimile: (801)798-3576
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IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTG COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORDON
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees,
Petitioners,

RONALD JENSEN and
GERALDINE JENSEN,

ORDER DENYING
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
AMEND FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS AND
JUDGMENT
Case No. 030404224
Judge Gary D. Stott

Respondents.

On February 17,2005, the court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment and Order. Petitioners filed a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Order. Petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of the motion.
Respondents opposed the motion and filed a Memorandum in opposition. Petitioners
filed a rebuttal Memorandum and a Notice to Submit for Decision. Neither party
requested oral argument on the motion. The matter was submitted to the Honorable Gary
D. Stott, District Judge, for decision. Having considered the points and authorities raised
by the parties in the several memoranda, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBYORDERED as follows:

0132

1. There are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and respondents are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Petitioners have not raised any issues or law or fact that required amendment
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment heretofore entered
by the court.
3. Petitioners* motion dated March 4, 2005, to Alter or Amend the Findings of

Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the foregoing order will be
submitted to the court for signature unless and objection to the order is made within five days
after service of this order.

Harold D. Mitchell
Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on June 13 , 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order and Notice to counsel for petitioners by depositing the same in the United States
mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mark N. Brian
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 173
8124 South 3200 West
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

Harold D. Mitchell
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EXHIBIT 3

Harold D. Mitchell (#2276)
Attorney for Defendants
324 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801)798-3574
Facsimile: (801)798-3576
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IN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
Si M L u l UTAH
G&C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORh
CASE and CLAUDIA CASE, Trust.

)

Petitioners,
-vRONALD JENSEN and GERALDINE
JENSEN,
"

mcknh

)

FINDINGS OF FACT

)

CONCLUSIONS O F !

)

Case No. 030404224

)
)

Judge Gary Stott

.

)

Respondents' motion for summary judgment was heard by the court on November
29, 2004, before the Honorable Gary I > I Holt, l^isti ict Judge. , eutioners were
represented by Mark N. Brian. Respondents were represented by Har^H <»

1»>

.1.

The court reviewed the affidavits and memoranda filed by the parties regarding the
motion and heard the argument of counsel for the parties. Based on the affidavits filed
with the court, the court makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Respondents own land located at 3535 South 7550 West, Benianr I
referred to hereafter as the "Jensen Land".
2. Petitioners own land adjacent to and along the east boundary of fl land owned
by respondents, referred 'i t:,.-,•
•i ••

ine "Case Land
< d | O I I I I I I ^ I.lllll

0/fia

4. An irrigation ditch has been in place along the north/south boundary between
the Jensen Land and the Case Land for more than 100 years. The irrigation ditch was
lined with concrete in 1967 and the ditch has been in its present location and alignment
since at least that date.
5. Respondents have occupied and used the land west of and to the east bank of
the ditch. Since at least 1967, respondents and their predecessors in interest have used
the ditch and land to the east bank of the ditch for residential and agricultural purposes.
Respondents and their predecessors in interest have not used or occupied any land east of
the east bank of the ditch.
6. Petitioners have occupied and used the land east of and to the east bank of the
ditch. Since at least 1967, petitioners and their predecessors have used the land east of
and to the east bank of the ditch for agricultural purposes. Petitioners and their
predecessors in interest have not used or occupied any land west of the east bank of the
ditch.
7. Respondents and their predecessors in interest and petitioners and their
predecessors in interest have mutually acquiesced in the east bank of the ditch as the
boundary between the Jensen Land and the Case Land.
From the foregoing, the court draws the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. There are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and respondents are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. The east bank of the irrigation ditch is a visible line marking the boundary
between the Jensen Land and the Case Land.

I

II III mi lull 1 ni t >i iiiiil I h e n p i e d o < e s s c u » In n t iiniilii illll'i i i | i n u s u ill i n III iill I n n ii llii

boundary between the Jensen Land and the Case Land
.^quiescence in the boundai > vi as foi more than 20 years.
\11 of the elements of boundary be acquiescence have been proven
Respondents are entitled to an order and judgment estal: lishing the east bank of
the irrigation ditch as the boundary between the Jensen Land and the <

'$:?:?£<£$

Appn

Mark N. Brian
Attorney for Petitioners

EXHIBIT 4

4TH D
:

Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDON( >l K.! I !'<
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Fax:(801)328-0537
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

G & C CASE FAMILY TRUST, GORD^*
and CLAUDIA CASE, Trustees,
™ ntiff,

RONALD JENSEN & GERALDINE
JENSEN,
Pefeu<..i;i! <:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. 030404224
Judge Gary D. Stott
Division 4

Plaintiff G&C Case Family Trust (Gordon and Claudia Case Trustees), by counsel,
h rt'hv apprals in (lie I Hull Mnipiciiin I '"uiirt Irani the lual court's final order denying Petitioners'
Motion to Amend Conclusions and Judgment in the above-entitled action rnfiD\U!!

. ,. j y * ^ .day of July, 2005
.„ HjOi BR-

pton
Defendants

704059vl

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this / t*^ nay of July, 2005:
Harold D. Mitchell
324 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

704059v!
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